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COLORADO

Report of the Special Master
-on the Equitable Apportionment
of the Vermejo River

v.
NEW
S
RY:
------=----

The Special Master (Ewing T. Kerr) has filed a report

in this original action which was brought to determine whether
Colorado is entitled to any diversion of the Vermejo River.

After

reviewing all of the available evidence and the applicable case law
on equitable apportionment, he concludes that Colorado (Plaintiff)
should be permitted a transmountain diversion of 4,000 acre-fee per

1/
calendar year.

The diversion would be from three creeks- which have

their source within Colorado's boundaries and ultimately feed into
the Vermejo River running through portions of New Mexico.
!/Ricardo Creek, Little Vermejo Creek, and Fish Creek.

..

f

-

DISCUSSION:

2 -

It is appropriate to follow the usual procedure

by ordering the Report to be filed and inviting the parties to file

y

exceptions.

A detailed memorandum will be prepared after the

parties reply or the timing for filing their replies has expired.
There is no response.
1/27/82

I
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2/Exceptions to the Report should be filed within 45 days and
any replies should be filed within 30 days thereafter.
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May 27, 1982 Conference
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No. 80 Original

Exceptions of New Mexico to Report of
the Special Master and Reply.

COWRADO

Motion of Kaiser Steel Corporation,
et al. for Leave to File a Brief as
Amici Curiae.

v.
NEW MEXI

su

1982, the Special Master {Ewing T. Kerr} filed

--- ___

his Report in this litigation centering on use by Colorado of water diverted
~

--·

........

___...

from the Verrnejo River.l He concluded that Colorado is entitled to a
'--""

....,

transmountain diversion of 4,000 acre-feet per calendar year.

New Mexico has

now filed exceptions to the Report, users of the river have filed an amicus
brief, and Colorado has filed responses both to New Mexico's exceptions and to
the amicus brief.

Colorado has waived the right to file exceptions to the

Report.
FACTS:

~

This original action was instituted by Colorado in an attempt to

determine its water rights with regard to the Vermejo River, a non-navigable

--.....--

- 2 -

interstate river which originates in Colorado and runs into New Mexico.2
map showing the River's location is attached.

A

In April 1979, the matter was

referred to the Special Master who after 16 days of hearing evidence submitted
his Report on January 9, 1982.

Based upon the evidence presented and the

applicable case law on equitable

apportionment, ~~~ that Colorado was
A---

entitled to a transmountain diversion of 4,000 acre-feet
per calendar year.
/
The diversion would be from three Colorado creeks3 which feed into the
vermejo.

Recognizing that Colorado had, in a sense, a junior appropriation in

the nature of an inchoate water right, the Master concluded that the equities
favored granting the diversion.
....,

1982.

......

..._...

The Report was accepted on February 22,

The following papers were subsequently filed:
(1)

Exceptions by New Mexico to the Master's Report;

(2)

Amicus brief by various users of the Vermejo River;

(3)

Response by Colorado to the Amicus brief; and

(4)

Reply brief by Colorado to New Mexico's exceptions.

EXCEPI'IONS BY NEW MEXICO:

New Mexico offers six excepti_9ns to the

Special Master's report:
(1)

The Special Master has misconstrued and misapplied the law of

equitable apportionment.

The precedent from this Court (eight cases) has

turned on principles intended to reflect the equities involved.

All of the

factors in those cases, applied to this case, indicate that the equities lie
with New Mexico.

the Vermejo River to beneficial
~ ... ,......-,
.....
,
use; it therefore possesses no equities to justify a diversion. Although not

--

Colorado has never
~

a~ed
......

~ ~

-......

2The action originated in a suit by Kaiser Steel Corp. (New Mexico user
of the river) against CF&I (Colorado prospective user). The DC (N.M. 1976)
issued an injunction forbidding CF&I to divert any water. Colorado
subsequently filed its complaint in this Court.
3Ricardo Creek, Little vermejo Creek, and Fish Creek.

...

''

·'

- 3 -

absolute,

the

gu~ding principl~here.

By

granting a diversion, the Master has given Colorado the first priority.
(2)

The Special Master errs in concluding that the Court will balance

the detriment to existing uses.

His conclusion that New Mexico will suffer no

injury is not supported by the evidence nor is it justifiable as a matter of
law.

New Mexico cites numerous exhibits and statistics to demonstrate the
.,

great need by its users of the Vermejo River.
---~

~~-

.............,..,

....

Noting the "incompleteness" of

the Report, New Mexico concludes that the Special Master could not have
completely considered its interests in making his recommendations to the
Court.

He has ignored New Mexico's existing rights and the rights of the

users downstream.
(3)

The Report does not evaluate facts essential to this case.

Thus, it

is impossible for this Court to adopt, reject, or modify the Report without an
independent review of the record.

"For example, the Master ignored 41,000

acres of irrigated lands with rights in Vermejo waters below its confluence
with the Canadian River ••• •

Much of the Master's Report is based upon data

obtained during severe drought conditions. in the 70's.
(4)

The Master's findings and conclusions are internally inconsistent

and contradictory.

Although the Master coneludes that a diversion of water

would not injure New Mexico, he concludes that priority of appropriation
should not govern users of the Vermejo River.

However, as noted by this

Court, if there is no injury there is no reason not to apply priorty of
appropriation.
wyoming, 325
(5)

See wyoming v. Colorado, 259

u.s.

u.s.

419 (1922), Nebraska v.

589 (1945) and Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).

The Master failed to rule expressly on the propriety of Colorado

(which had abandoned its own interests in the Vermejo) bringing this action on
behalf of Colorado FUel and Iron Steel Corp (CF&I).

New Mexico argues in its

..

~.

,_·

'

'

- 4 -

Colorado failed to make any beneficial use of the .v ermejo.

Further, Colorado

cannot maintain an .original parens patriae action for the purpose of voiding
an injunction against a single corporation--CF&I.

That corporation persuaded
"' ·
Colorado to institute this action after it was enjoined by a DC. Indeed,
after suit was filed, the general counsel for CF&I was commissioned as a
Special Assistant Attorney General to act in the

lit~gation.

This Court has

declined to find original jurisdiction where the State is a plaintiff in name
only and not the real party in interest.

u.s.

See, e.g., Oklahoma v. Cook, 304

387 (1938); Kansas v. United states, 204
(6)

u.s.

331 (1907).

The Special Master ignored this Court's precedent and reached the

"empty conclusion that the nature of the action (apportionment) compels a
division of water."
commenced.

That preconceived notion biased the Master before trial

That fact, combined with his failure to state the essential facts,

renders his Report "wholly lacking in substance and

n~rit."

Thus, the Court should reject the Report, 90nduct an independent review
of the record, and apply the principles of equitable apportionment as laid out
in prior decisions.
REPLY BY

COWRADO

TO NEW MEXICO'S EXCEPI'IONS:

Colorado responds to New

Mexico's exceptions by arguing that:
(1)

The Special Master properly applied the law of equitable

apportionment.

New Mexico contends that the only factor to be considered in

equitable apportionment is priority of appropriation.

,,

This Court, however,

,.

has recognized in water apportionment cases that equitable apportionment
requires consideration of many factors. See, ~' Kansas v. Colorado, 206
...
........-.....
~.........
u.s. 46, 117 (1907). Further, New Mexico did not sustain its burden of
demonstrating that diversions by Colorado would seriously injure New Mexico
and its citizens.

Although Colorado is the plaintiff, case law places the _t(~

--..

burden of proof on the downstream user' i.e. I New Mexico.

See e.g ~

. . . . ~ - ...I ..

:I

r~r

I

.•

- 5 -

Kansas v. Colorado, 206

u.s.

46, 117 (1907); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282

U.S. 660, 669 (1931); and Colorado v. Kansas, 320

u.s.

383, 393-94 (1943).

New Mexico's position is contrary to the well-established rule that the
objective in this type of a case is to apportion the waters of an interstate
stream on the basis of equities.
This litigation is not barred
.. by the Elev~nth Amendment.

(2)

That

argument has been unsuccessfully raised by New Mexico in its Brief in
Opposition to Motion for Leave to File Complaint and was raised again before
the Special Master.

Colorado, as does New Mexico, has a substantial interest

in this litigation because it is trustee for the waters within its territory.
The cases cited by New Mexico on this point do not involve equitable
apportionment proceedings involving water rights.
(3)

The doctrine of laches does not bar Colorado's claim.

"displayed" its interest in the Vermejo when appropriate.
state to share in its natural resources is vested.

Colorado has

The right of a

New Mexico's argument

would require a state to take affirmative steps to preserve rights even though
they were not threatened.

This argument

py

New Mexico is "one more desperate

ploy• to obtain all the water from the vermejo and prevent the Court f~
considering the equities of the case.
(4)

The Special Master's Report equitably apportions the

~~er one-half of
~,~A~ersion

~,flow.

41"'-

~~--

Rive~ First,

the water supply for the river originates in Colorado.

And a

of 4,000 acre-feet is approximately one-fourth of the system's total

Second, Colorado

i~ experiencing a

where the apportionment would occur.

critical water shortage in the area

Third, any adverse irrpact caused by the

diversion can be minimized through proper administration and conservation
measures
(

py New Mexico. The facts presented show that users ih New Mexico

have not fully appropriated the Vermejo River; other water sources are
available and underutilized.

The only water user which could be injured is

'·'

- 6 -

the Vermejo Conservancy District.

Evidence showeq that its use of water is

inefficient--in part because the majority of farmers in the district engage in
farming on a part-time basis.
the Chico Rico River.

Again, other water is available in the form of

Third, it would be inequitable to deny Colorado access

to the Vermejo in order to permit New Mexico and its users to continue
wasteful practices.

I

.,

(5)

colorado addresses a number of specific points raised in New

Mexico's exceptions.

The gist of those points is that (a)

New Mexico has

twisted the facts to suit its arguments; the Master carefully considered all
of the evidence presented and the fact that he did not address all of its fine
points does not diminish the validity of his conclusions.
included in New Mexico's brief are improper.

(b)

The appendices

They purport to reflect data

calculated on the basis of Colorado Exhibits 69 and 10: They are internally
inconsistent and misleading.
In sum, the Special Master's conclusions are correct--based upon a
consideration of the equities.
MOTION TO FILE AMICUS BRIEF:

Four New Mexico users of the Vermejo River

(Kaiser steel Corp., Phelps Dodge Corp., Vermejo Park Corp., and Vermejo
Conservancy District) move for leave to file an amicus brief in support of New
Mexico.

Arguing that a diversion of water by Colorado would cause them severe

and irreparable injury, they aver that they should be permitted to file an
amicus brief • . In that brief they contend that:

(1)

The Special Master

misunderstood the evidence; he equated •average• flow with dependable
predictable flow.

(2)

He also misunderstood the doctrine of equitable

apportionment.
The state of Colorado responds to this motion for leave to file by
arguing that:

(2)

The four corporations are already represented by New

Mexico under the principle of parens patriae.

~~

':£• •'

(2)

They have not shown that

- 7 -

their interests are not adequately protected by New Mexico.

In fact, Mr.

Stillinger, Esq., who is listed as "of counsel" on the amicus brief
participated in the hearings before the Special Master as a Special Assistant
Attorney General for New Mexico.
already filed by New Mexico.

())

(4)

The brief is repetitious with the brief

Colorado should not be burdened with also

responding to this amicus brief.
I

DISCUSSION:

The Master's Repor't seems sound.

Although it is extremely

difficult to gauge the exact worth of his factual conclusions, they seem
reasonable in the context of the equitable solution suggested.

The parties

may forever dispute the technical aspects of this case but the point remains
that based upon the law and facts presented, Colorado is entitled to an
equitable apportionment.

____...---....-

Even assuming that the Special Master understated

the actual threat to New Mexico, his conclusion that a diversion of 4,000
acre-feet is due Colorado is more than reasonable.
generally recognized that

This Court has in the past

~iority~ ~P?rtionment is_~t controlling; other,L~

factors, such as impact on the economy of a state, should be considered.
Special

~aster

Th~

did so in this case.

~

The exceptions by New Mexico do not present a serious challenge to the
~ster's

Report.

Accordingly, the court should direct the

~ster

to draft a

proposed decree.
There does not seem to be a compelling need to hear oral argument on the

-

wide-ranging factual disp..ltes which arose in this case.

One might be

warranted, however, if the Court is concerned with the authority of Colorado
to prosecute this case on behalf of its citizens.
As for the motion for leave to file an amicus brief, it should be
denied.

The four entities have been well represented by the defendant, New

Mexico, and their brief essentially restates arguments already raised by New

(

, •.

- 8 J

Mexico.

Indeed, the crux of New Mexico's position is the impact of the

proposed diversion on the .four entities.
There are responses from Colorado on New Mexico's exceptions and the
motion to file an amicus brief.

~
PJC
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June 10, 1982 Conference
Supplemental List
No. 80 Original

Motion for Leave to File Reply Brief

COIDRADO

v.
NEW MEXICO, et al.

SUMMARY:

In response to New Mexico's exceptions to the Special Master's

Report,l Colorado filed a Reply Brief.

On

June 1, 1982, the Court set New

Mexico's Exceptions for argument in due course.

New Mexico now moves for

leave to file a response to Colorado's Reply Brief.
CONTENTIONS:

New Mexico argues that Colorado's Reply Brief has presented

an erroneous legal theory and contains an incomplete discussion of applicable
precedents.

Further, the brief contains distorted facts and an extensive

response to New Mexico's arguments in its Exceptions.

Therefore, New Mexico

must reply to Colorado's brief in order for the Court to •fairly appreciate
the significance of the facts and legal points at issue.•
lsee Legal Office memo of May 27, 1982.
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.::;

not: spec1a11y address the

.f'(u.Le.::; aoes

' filing of briefs such as the one offered by New Mexico.

However, Rule 9 does

state that "additional pleadings" may be filed as .the Court directs.

Because

New Mexico's brief will offer some assistance in assessing the merits of this
original litigation, it seems appropriate to grant the motion.
There is no response.
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1.

Should the principle of priority of appropriation be varied

in an equitable apportionment of the Vermejo River to provide for
future developments in pltf at the expense of an existing economy in

G, ~ ~- ~~~~~/~--:

deft?
2.

Does

~e

eleventh amendment preclude pltf from obtaining a

decree in this action solely for the be nefit of one of its citizens?

.,

'

.

.

..

NEBRASKA v. WYOMING.

GRM, 1944.
te Court.

325U.S.

water rights to the United
e rights of the landowners.
~ho represent their citizens
tng,12 in no wise interferes
on by the United States of
·orks, and facilities. Thus
' by the United States of
ly academic so far as the
ncerned.

tt if we undertake an apthis interstate river, we
involving administrative
We noted in Colorado v.
:lse controversies between
.tate streams "involve the
present complicated and
the possibility of future
~te expert administration
of a hard and fast rule.
priately be composed by
ursuant to the compact
on. We say of this case,
: differences of like nature,
m and agreement should,
ttlement, instead of invorer." But the efforts at
::l. A genuine controversy
:ance of the case are apng and enforcing a decree
tse to perform the importhe Constitution. Those
Missouri v. /Uinoi&, 180 U. S.

589

617

Opinion of the Court.

considerations did not prevail in Wyoming v. Colorado,
supra, where an apportionment of the waters of an interstate stream was made. Nor did they prevail in the drainage canal cases. Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U. S. 367, 281
U. S.l79, 309 U.S. 569,311 U. S.107, 313 U.S. 547. And
see Sanitary District v. United States, 266 U.S. 405. We
do not believe they should prevail here.
We recognize the difficulties of the problem. The matter is a delicate one and extremely complex. To begin
with we are confronted with the problem of equitable
apportionment. The Special Master recommen e a ecree based oh t hat principle. That was indeed the principle adopted by the Court in Wyoming v. Colorado, supra,
where an apportionment of the waters of an interstate
stream was made between two States, each of which had
the rule of appropriation. In speaking of that rule in
application___t9 a controversy~een States the Court,
through ~r. Justice Van Eevante~said: "T~ Cljrdinal
rule of thedo-ctrine is that t riority of appro riation ives
su eriority of rig,ht. Eacnof es;;-' a es applies and
enforces this rule in her own territory, and it is the one
to which intending appropriators naturally would turn
for guidance. The principle on which if proceeds is not
less applicable to interstate streams and controversies
than to others. Both States pronounce the rule just and
reasonable as applied to the natural conditions in that
region; and to prevent any departure from it the people
of both incorporated it into their constitutions. It originated in the customs and usages of the people before
either State came into existence, and the courts of both
hold that their constitutional provisions are to be taken
as recognizing the prior usage rather than as creating a
new rule. These considerations persuade us that it~li
cation to suc~Sherepre8ented. cannot
be-otnertllail·eminently just and equitable to all concerned." 259 U.S. p. 470. And see Wyoming v. Colorad~,

\

I

618

OCTOBER TERM, 1944.
Opinion of the Court.

325U.8.

286 U.S. 494; Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517, 526.
Since Colorado, Wyoming, and Nebraska are appropriation States, that principle would seem to be equally applicable here.
That does not mean that there must be a literal a plication o
e prwnty rule.
e s ated in o orado v.
ansas, supra, that in determining whether one State is
"using, or threatening to use, more than its equitable share
of the benefits of a stream, ·all the fa~tors which create
equities in favor of one State or t't:e ot~t be w~ighed
as of the date when the controversy is mooted.'; .. 3·20 U. S.
p. 394. That case did not involve a controversy between
two appropriation States. But if an allocation between
appropriation States is to be just and equitable, strict
adherence to the priority rule may not be possible.For
example, tlle"ecoiiomyofaregiOiililay -haveoeen established on the basis of 'unior a ro riations. So far as
possible those es ablishe uses should be protected though
_..uvfA~~Jf1~itt application o
e prionty rule might jeopardize
b¥.17111""'"
them. Apportionment calls for the exercise of an in" formed judgment on a consideration of many factors.
Priorit of appr~ riation is the '!i_ding princi~ But
physic·a an c rmatic conditions, the consumptive use of
water in the several sections of the river; the character
and rate of return flows, the extent of established uses, the
availability of storage water, the practical effect of wasteful uses on downstream areas, the damage to upstream
areas as compared to the benefits to downstream areas if
a limitation is imposed on the former-these are all relevant factors. They are merely an illustrative, not an
exhaustive catalogue. They indicate the nature of the
problem of apportionment and the delicate adjustment
of interests which must be made.
Practical considerations of this order underlie Nebraska's concession that the priority rule should not be
strictly applied to appropriations in Colorado, though

I
I

~ ~U<.-a-<-~-

~- _, -~~

f" ~--:-: . • . •

x.v

7Lo ~~' ~~..1

lfp/ss 09/29/82
MEMORANDUM TO THE FILE
80 Orig. Colorado v. New Mexico
Both parties agree that the applicable principle
is "equitable apportionment", and the Special Master
purported to apply this doctrine in allocating 4,000 acre
feet of water from the Vermejo river to Colorado.
The parties quarrel as to the meaning and
application of the doctrine.
character.

Both agree it is equitable in

New Mexico, however, states that in this case

all of the equities favor it because the water in this river
- all of it - had been appropriated for nearly a century by
New Mexico users.

Therefore the "equities" lay with the

parties (two industries and several public irrigation
projects) dependent upon the water.

The economy of the

state and the investments of these parties were at issues.
Colorado insists first that the retention of 4,000
acre feet would not adversely affect downstream users, and
apparently the Special Master agreed.

Possibly the case

would turn on whether we accept this finding of the Special
Master.
Both parties rely on Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325
589 (19 44) (Douglas, J.).

u.s.

The critical language is found on

pages 617 and 618 of t he opinion - at t ached to this memo.
Quoting from Justice Van Devanter, in Wyoming v.
Colorado, 259 U.S. 470, New Mexico argues:

.
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"The cardinal rule of the doctrine is that
priority of appropriation gives superiority
of right. * * * Priority of appropriation is
the guiding principle"." Nebraska v. Wyoming,
at pp. 617, 618.
Colorado responds, relying on language from the
same opinion in Wyoming v. Colorado that although priority
of appropriation may be the cardinal rule, "there must [not]
be a literal application of that rule".

p. 618.

Justice

Douglas goes on to quote from Colorado v. Kansas to say that
"all the factors which create equities in favor of one state
or the other must be weighed as of the date when the
controvery is mooted". 320

u.s.,

at 394.

Strict adherence

to the priority rule may not be possible.
But after the foregoing qualifications, Justice
Douglas states:
"The economy of a region may have been
established on the basis of junior
appropriations (as well as senior). So far
as possible those established uses (in both
states) should be protected though strict
application of the priority rule might
jeopardize them".

* * *
If, as New Mexico claims, the burden of proof in
this case is on Colorado - as it is the plaintiff in this
action - I am inclined to think New Mexico should prevail.
It seems to be conceded even by Colorado that there has been
no actual prior appropriation of any water in Colorado, only
the in choate right a Colorado state court created for the

3.

beneift of a single industry:

Colorado Fuel & Iron Steel

Corp. {CF& I Corp.)

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

lfp/ss 09/29/82
MEMORANDUM TO THE FILE
80 Orig. Colorado v. New Mexico
Both parties agree that the applicable principle
is "equitable apportionment", and the Special Master
purported to apply this doctrine in allocating 4,000 acre
feet of water from the Vermejo river to Colorado.
The parties quarrel as to the meaning and
application of the doctrine.
character.

Both agree it is equitable in

New Mexico, however, states that i.n this case
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application of the priority rule might
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From: Jim
Re: Colorado v. New Mexico, No. 80 Original

Regarding the standard of review this Court uses in reviewing a
master's factual findings, the Court in United States v. Raddatz,

447

u.s.

667, 683 n.ll (1980), stated: "In original cases, as under

the Federal Magistrates Act, the master's recommendations are
advisory only, yet this Court regularly acts on the basis of the
~

.......

master's report and exceptions thereto."

This is dictum, and the

--==---

Court gives no citation in support, but as a descriptive matter, I
think the Court is right.

As a policy matter, I think the Court

should give great deference to the master's factual findings.
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October 12, 1982

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

/
Dear Chief:
This note will follow up our telephone conversation of
yesterday afternoon.
I feel that No. 80 Original should not be assigned to
me, and should be reassigned. According to my notes, there
were five votes (CJ, WJB, BRW, TM, and WHR) to vacate and
remand; two votes to sustain the objections of New Mexico
(LP and SOC); and two to overrule the objections of New
Mexico (JPS and HAB).
I therefore am not a member of the
majority.
I thus have no assignment for the first week.
Sincerely,

II t-.l
-

The Chief Justice
cc: The Conference

:0 '

,L

·ro: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Blackmun
ustice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:

Justice Marshall
~

)
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
STATE OF COLORADO, PLAINTIFF v. STATE OF
NEW MEXICO AND ROBERT K. CORGIN, ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF NEW MEXICO
ON BILL OF COMPLAINT

No. 80, Orig.

Decided November-, 1982

delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns the proper apportionment between
New Mexico and Colorado of the water of an interstate river.
The water of the Vermejo River is at present fully appropriated by users in New Mexico. Colorado seeks to divert water for future uses. Invoking this Court's original jurisdiction under Article 3, § 2 of the Constitution, Colorado
brought this action for an equitable apportionment of the water of Vermejo River. A Special Master appointed by the
Court recommended that Colorado be permitted a diversion
of 4,000 acre-feet per year. The case is before us on New
Mexico's exceptions to the Special Master's report.
JusTICE MARSHALL

I

The Vermejo River is a small, nonnavigable river that
originates in the snow-belt of the Rocky Mountains in southern Colorado and flows southeasterly into New Mexico for a
distance of roughly 55 miles before it joins the Canadian
River. The major portion of the river is located in New
Mexico. The Colorado portion consists of three tributaries
that combine to form the Vermejo River proper approximately one mile below the Colorado-New Mexico border. At
present there are no uses of the water of the Vermejo River
in Colorado, and no use or diversion has ever been made in
Colorado. In New Mexico, by contrast, farmers and industrial users have diverted water from the Vermejo for many
years. In 1941 a New Mexico state court issued a decree

..

I
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apportioning the water of the Vermejo River among the various New Mexico users. 1
In 1975, a Colorado corporation, Colorado Fuel and Iron
Steel Corporation ("C.F. & 1."), obtained in Colorado state
court a conditional right to divert 75 cubic feet per second
from the headwaters of the Vermejo River. 2 C.F. & I. proposed a transmountain diversion of the water to a tributary
of the Purgatoire River in Colorado to be used for industrial
development and other purposes. Upon learning of this decree, the four principal New Mexico users-Phelps Dodge
Corporation ("Phelps Dodge"), Kaiser Steel Corporation
("Kaiser Steel"), Vermejo Park Corporation ("Vermejo
Park"), and the Vermejo Conservancy District ("Conservancy District"}-filed suit in United States District Court
for the District of New Mexico, seeking to enjoin any diversion by C.F. & I. that would violate their senior rights. On
January 16, 1978, the District Court enjoined C.F. & I. from
diverting any water from the Vermejo River in derogation of
the senior water rights of New Mexico users. 3 The court
found that under the doctrine of prior appropriation, which
both New Mexico and Colorado recognize, 4 the New Mexico
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. W. S. Land and Cattle Co., No. 7201 (D.C. Cty.
Colfax 1941).
2
In re the Application for Water Rights of C. F. & I. Corp., No. W-3961
(Dist. Ct., W. Div. No.2, June 20, 1975).
8
Kaiser Steel Corporation et al. v. C.F. & I. Steel Corporation, Civil
No. 76-244 (D.N.M. 1978). The injunction was not based on a determination of the right of the two states under the law of equitable apportionment, since neither Colorado nor New Mexico was a party to the action.
• N.M. Const. Art. XVI, § 2; Colo. Const. Art. XVI, § 5, 6. The administration of water rights in each state is governed by statute. Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 37-92-101 et seq. (1973); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 72-1-1 et seq. (1978).
The prior appropriation doctrine and the riparian doctrine are the two
basic doctrines governing the rights to the use of water. Under the prior
appropriation doctrine, recognized in most of the western states, water
rights are acquired by diverting water and applying it for a beneficial purpose. A distinctive feature of the prior appropriation doctrine is the rule
of priority, under which the relative rights of water users are ranked in the
order of their seniority. Under the riparian doctrine, recognized primar1

------------ - -

COLORADO v. NEW MEXICO

3

users were entitled to have their needs fully satisfied because
their appropriation was first in time. C.F. & I. filed a notice
of appeal, and the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has
stayed its proceedings during the pendency of this case before us.
In June 1978 Colorado moved for leave to file an original
complaint in this Court. New Mexico opposed the motion.
On April 16, 1979, we granted Colorado's motion and appointed the Honorable Ewing T. Kerr, Senior Judge of the
United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, as
Special Master in this case. After a lengthy trial involving
an extensive presentation of evidence, the Special Master
submitted a report to the Court on January 9, 1982. Thereport was accepted for filing on February 22, 1982.
The Special Master found that most of the water of the
Vermejo River is consumed by the · New Mexico users and ·
that very little, if any, reaches the confluence with the Canadian River. He thus recognized that strict application of the
rule of priority would not permit Colorado any diversion
since the entire available supply is needed to satisfy the demands of appropriators in New Mexico with senior rights.
Nevertheless, applying the principle of equitable apportionment established in our prior cases, he recommended permitting Colorado a transmountain diversion of 4,000 acre-feet 5
ily in the eastern, midwestern and southern states, the owner of land
contiguous to a watercourse is entitled to have the stream flow by or
through his land undiminished in quantity and unpolluted in quality, except
that any riparian proprietor may make whatever use of the water that is
reasonable with respect to the needs of other appropriators.
Appropriative rights do not depend on land ownership and are acquired
and maintained by actual use. Riparian rights, by contrast, originate
from land ownership and remain vested even if unexercized. Appropriative rights are fixed in quantity; riparian rights are variable depending on
streamflow and subject to the reasonable uses of others. See generally 1
R. Clark, Waters and Water Rights (1967); W. Hutchins, Selected Problems in the Law of Water Rights in the West (U. S. Dept. of Agriculture,
Misc. Pub. No. 418) (1942); 1 W. Hutchins, Water Rights Laws in the
Nineteen Western States (U. S. Dept. of Agriculture, Misc. Pub. No.
1206) (1971).
6
An acre-foot is a volumetric measurement which means the amount of

.

> ~.

4

COLORADO v. NEW MEXICO

of water per year from the headwaters of the Vermejo River.
He stated:
"It is the opinion of the Master that a transmountain
diversion would not materially affect the appropriations
granted by New Mexico for users downstream. A thorough examination of the existing economies in New Mexico convinces the Master that the injury to New Mexico,
if any, will be more than offset by the benefit to Colorado." Report of the Special Master, p. 23.
Explaining his conclusion, the Special Master noted that
any injury to New Mexico would be restricted to the Conservancy District, the user in New Mexico furthest downstream,
since there was sufficient water in the Vermejo River for the
three other principal New Mexico water users, Vermejo
Park, Kaiser Steel, and Phelps Dodge. 6 He further found
that the "Vermejo Conservancy District has never been an
economically feasible operation." Ibid.
The Special Master's recommendation appears to rest on
two alternative grounds: first, that New Mexico could compensate for some or all the Colorado diversion through reasonable water conservation measures; 7 and second, that the
water required to cover one acre of ground one foot deep. One acre foot
equals 43,560 cubic feet or 325,900 gallons of water.
• The Conservancy District is the largest user of water from the
Vermejo River in New Mexico. It consists of over 60 farms irrigated by
an extensive system of canals and reservoirs. The U. S. Maxwell Wildlife
Refuge is also located within the District. In the early 1950's the District
was part of a large reclamation project funded by the federal Government.
Vermejo Park diverts water primarily to irrigate land used to grow hay
for its cattle operation. Kaiser Steel uses water primarily for its coal facilities. Phelps Dodge leases its rights to Kaiser Steel and to the C.S.
Springer Cattle Company.
7
This is a fair reading of the Special Master's conclusion that New Mexico users would not be "materially affected" by the recommended diversion. While the report does not expressly state that Colorado's diversion
might be offset by reasonable conservation efforts, it does refer specifically
to the waste and inefficiency of the Conservancy District's system of water
canals. Special Master's Report, at 23, 8. In addition, in its second ex-
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injury, if any, to New Mexico would be outweighed by the
benefit to Colorado from the diversion. In its various exceptions to his report, New Mexico challenges the Special Master's interpretation of the law of equitable apportionment.
New Mexico maintains that the rule of priority should be
strictly applied in this case to preclude Colorado from diverting any water from the Vermejo River. New Mexico also
challenges the factual bases of the Special Master's conclusions that the recommended diversion would not materially
affect New Mexico users and that any harm to New Mexico
would be offset by the benefits to Colorado. 8
ception to the report New Mexico acknowledges that the Special Master
based his conclusion that New Mexico users would not be materially affected on certain findings concerning waste and inefficiency within the
Conservancy District.
8
New Mexico also contends that Colorado is improperly suing directly
and solely for the benefit of a private individual-C.F. & I.-in violation of
the Eleventh Amendment, and that Colorado's suit is barred by laches.
We find no merit to·these claims.
Because the SU!.te of Colorado has a substantial interest in the outcome
of this suit, New Mexico may not invoke its Eleventh Amendment immunity from federal actions by citizens of another State. The portion of the
Vermejo River in Colorado is owned by the State in trust for its citizens.
Colo. Const. Article XVI, Section 5. While C.F. & I. will most likely be
the primary user of any water diverted from the Vermejo River, other Colorado citizens may jointly use the water or purchase water rights in the
future. In any event, Colorado surely has a sovereign interest in the beneficial effects of a diversion on the general prosperity of the State. Faced
with a similar set of circumstances in Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46, 99
(1907), we concluded that "[t]he controversy rises ... above a mere question oflocal private right and involves the matter of state interest and must
be considered from that standpoint."
We also conclude that Colorado is not barred by laches from seeking an
equitable apportionment. For the reasons that we elaborate below, pp.
--, post, we hold that under some circumstances the countervailing equities supporting a diversion of water for a future use in one state may justify
the detriment suffered by existing users in another state. Therefore the
mere fact that Colorado has no existing uses of the waters of the Vermejo
River and that current users in New Mexico may suffer some detriment
from a diversion does not bar Colorado's suit for an equitable apportionment for future uses. These circumstances, however, do bear on the bur-

·----···------.,.,...---
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We conclude that the criteria relied upon by the Special
Master comport with the doctrine of equitable apportionment
as it has evolved in. our prior cases. We thus reject New
Mexico's contention that the Special Master was required to
focus exclusively on the rule of priority. However, theReport of the Special Master does not contain sufficient factual
findings to enable us to assess the correctness of the Special
Master's application of the principle of equitable apportionment to the facts of this case. We therefore remand with instructions to the Special Master to make further findings of
fact.
II
Equitable apportionment is the doctrine of federal common
law that governs disputes between states concerning their
rights to use the water of an interstate stream. Kansas v.
Colorado, 206 U. S. 46, 98 (1907); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U. S. 660, 670-671 (1931). It is a flexible doctrine
which calls for "the exercise of an informed judgment on a
consideration of many factors" to secure a "just and equitable" allocation. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U. S. 589, 618
(1945). We have stressed that in arriving at "the delicate
adjustment of interests which must be made," ibid., we must
consider all relevant factors, including:
"physical and climatic conditions, the consumptive use of
water in the several sections of the river, the character
and rate of return flows, the extent of established uses,
the availability of storage water, the practical effect of
wasteful uses on downstream areas, [and] the damage to
upstream areas as compared to the benefits to downstream areas if a limitation is imposed on the former."
Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U. S. 589, 618 (1945).
den of proof that Colorado must satisfy to justify the possible disruption of
existing uses. See pp. - , post. A contrary conclusion is not dictated
by Washington v. Oregon, 297 U. S. 517, 528 (1936), or Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U. S. 383, 394 (1943) (dictum), which merely require established
users or holders of water rights to exercise diligence in protecting their
rights and putting them to beneficial uses. See pp. -,post, and note 9,
infra.

'
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Our aim is always to secure a just and equitable apportionment "without quibbling over formulas." New Jersey v.
New York, 283 U. S. 336, 343 (1931).
The laws of the contending states concerning intrastate
water disputes are an important consideration governing equitable apportionment. When, as in this case, both states
recognize the doctrine of prior appropriation, priority becomes the "guiding principle" in an allocation between competing states. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U. S., at 618.
But state law is not controlling. Rather, the just apportionment of interstate waters is a question of federal law that depends "upon a consideration of the pertinent laws of the contending States and all other relevant facts." Connecticut v.
Massachusetts, 282 U. S., at 670-671 (emphasis added).
In reaching his recommendation the Special Master did not
focus exclusively on the rule of priority, but considered other
factors such as the efficiency of current uses in New Mexico
and the balance of benefits to Colorado and harm to New
Mexico. New Mexico contends that it is improper to consider these other factors. It maintains that this Court has
strictly applied the rule of priority when apportioning water
between states adhering to the prior appropriation doctrine,
and has departed from that rule only to protect an existing
economy built upon junior appropriations. Since there is no
existing economy in Colorado dependent upon the use of water from the Vermejo River, New Mexico contends that the
rule of priority is controlling. We disagree with this inflexible interpretation of the doctrine of equitable
apportionment.
Our prior cases clearly establish that equitable apportionment will protect only those rights to water that are "reasonably acquired and applied." Wyoming v. Colorado, 259
U. S. 419, 484 (1922). Especially in those Western states
where water is scarce, "[t]here must be no waste ... of the
'treasure' of a river. . . . Only diligence and good faith will
keep the privilege alive." Washington v. Oregon, 297 U. S.
517, 527 (1936). Thus, wasteful or inefficient uses will not be
protected. See ibid.; Nebraska v. Wyoming, supra, at 618.
Similarly, concededly senior water rights will be deemed for-
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feited or substantially diminished where the rights have not
been exercised or asserted with reasonable diligence.
Washington v. Oregon, 297 U. S., at 527-528 (1936); Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U. S. 383, 394 (1943). 9
We have invoked equitable apportionment not only to require the reasonably efficient use of water, but also to impose
on states an affirmative duty to conserve and augment the
water supply of an interstate stream. In Wyoming v. Colorado, Wyoming brought suit to prevent a proposed diversion
by Colorado from the Laramie River. This Court calculated
the dependable supply available to both states, subtracted
the senior Wyoming uses, and permitted Colorado to divert
an amount not exceeding the balance. 10 In calculating the
dependable supply we placed on each state the duty to employ "financially and physically feasible" measures "adapted
to conserving and equalizing the natural flow." 259 U: S.,
at 484 (emphasis added). Adopting a position similar to New
Mexico's in this case, Wisconsin objected to a requirement
8

The requirement that water use be reasonably efficient and diligent is
not a departure from the prior appropriation doctrine. Rather, the requirement reflects a fundamental tenet of the prior appropriation doctrine
that "beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure, and the limit of the
right to the use of water." 1 R. Clark, supra, at§ 19.2, p. 86. Under the
principle of beneficial use, water rights will be forfeited upon non-use or
abandonment, and the right to use water is limited to those uses that are
reasonably efficient. !d., at§§ 51.8, 19.2. See also W. Hutchins, supra,
at 169-173, 306-309, 316--320.
10
This description is only roughly accurate, since we did not rigidly follow this procedure in apportioning the Laramie River, but instead departed from a strict application of the rule of priority in numerous respects.
For instance, our decree in Colorado v. Wyoming granted Colorado an unqualified right to divert 22,500 acre-feet, even though there were Wyoming
appropriations senior to the Colorado appropriations underlying the 22,500
acre-feet grant. 259 U. S., at 489-490. In addition, we granted to Colorado priority to divert a total of 37,750 acre-feet, even though some of the
underlying appropriations were junior to a number of Wyoming appropriations. Id., at 495-496. The effect was to guarantee water to junior appropriators in Colorado to the potential detriment of senior appropriators
downstream in Wyoming. See 2 R. Clark, Waters and Water Rights
§ 132.4 (1967).

COLORADO v. NEW MEXICO

9

that it employ conservation measures to facilitate Colorado's
proposed uses. The answer we gave is especially relevant to
this case:
"The question here is not what one state should do for
the other, but how each should exercise her relative
rights in the waters of this interstate stream. . . . Both
states recognize that conservation within practicable
limits is essential in order that needless waste may be
prevented and the largest feasible use may be secured.
This comports with the allpervading spirit of the doctrine of appropriation and takes appropriate heed of the
natural necessities out of which it arose. We think that
doctrine lays on each of these states a duty to exercise
her right reasonably and in a manner calculated to conserve the common supply.." Ibid. 11
We conclude that it is entirely appropriate to consider the
extent to which reasonable conservation measures by New
Mexico might offset the proposed Colorado diversion and
thereby minimize any injury to New Mexico users. Similarly, it is appropriate to consider whether Colorado has undertaken reasonable steps to minimize the amount of diversion that will be required.
In addition, we have held that in an equitable apportionment of interstate waters it is proper to weigh the harms and
benefits to competing states. In Kansas v. Colorado,
supra, where we first announced the doctrine of equitable
apportionment, we found that users in Kansas were injured
by Colorado's upstream diversions from the Arkansas River.
206 U. S., at 11~114, 117. Yet we declined to grant any relief to Kansas on the ground that the great benefit to ·colorado outweighed the detriment to Kansas. !d., at 100-101,
11~114, 117.
Similarly, in Nebraska v. Wyoming, supra,
u We thus required Wyoming to enhance and equalize the water supply
through "practicable storage and conservation" measures, such as the use
of storage facilities similar to those already in use in Wyoming. 259 U. S.,
at 485.

·'
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we held that water rights in Wyoming and Nebraska, which
under state law were senior, had to yield to the "countervailing equities" of an established economy in Colorado even
though it was based on junior appropriations. 325 U. S., at
622. We noted that the rule of priority should not be strictly
applied where it "would work more hardship" on the junior
user "than it would bestow benefits" on the senior user. /d.,
at 619. See also Washington v. Oregon, supra, 297 U. S., at
522. The same principle is applicable in balancing the benefits of a diversion for proposed uses against the possible
harms to existing uses. See, e. g., Colorado v. Wyoming,
supra (placing upon Wyoming, the state with senior water
rights, a duty to conserve water in order to facilitate a diversion for a proposed use in Colorado); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, supra; New Jersey v. New York, supra. 12
We recognize that the equities supporting the protection of
existing economies will often be compelling. The harm that
may result from disrupting established uses is typically certain and immediate, whereas the potential benefits from a
proposed diversion may be speculative and remote. Under
some circumstances, however, the countervailing equities
supporting a future use in one state may justify the detriment to existing users in another state. This may be the
case, for example, where the state seeking a diversion demonstrates that the benefits of the diversion substantially outweigh the harm that might result. This approach comports
12

In Connecticut v. Massachusetts we declined to enjoin Massachusetts'
proposed diversion for future uses. We took into account the impending
"serious water shortage" in the Boston area and the absence of ''real or
substantial injury or damage" to Connecticut. 282 U. S. 660, 664, 672
(1931). Although Connecticut v. Massachusetts, as well as New Jersey v.
New York, 283 U. S. 336 (1931), involved states that follow the riparian
rather than the prior appropriation doctrine, see note 4, supra, our allocation of water for future uses rested on the federal common law of equitable
apportionment, which, as we made clear, "is not governed by the same
rules of [state] law that are applied for the solution of similar questions of
private right." Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U. S., at 670; see also
New Jersey v. New York, supra, at 342-343. Nothing in those two cases
suggested that the apportionment of water for future uses in any way depended on the adherence of both states to the riparian doctrine.
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with our emphasis on flexibility in equitable apportionment
and also accords sufficient protection to existing uses.
We conclude, therefore, that in the determination of an equitable apportionment of the water of the Vermejo River the
rule of priority is not the sole criterion. While the equities
supporting the protection of established, senior uses are substantial, it is also appropriate to consider additional factors
relevant to a just apportionment, such as the conservation
measures available to both states and the balance of harm
and benefit that might result from the diversion sought by
Colorado.
III
Applying the doctrine of equitable apportionment, the Special Master recommended that Colorado be permitted to divert 4,000 acre-feet of water per year from the headwaters of
the Vermejo River. Because all of the water of the Vermejo
River is currently consumed by New Mexico appropriators,
the recommended diversion would necessarily reduce the
amount of water available to New Mexico.
In explaining the basis for his recommendation, the Special
Master stated that the diversion would not "materially affect" existing New Mexico appropriations. This conclusion
appears to reflect certain assumptions about the ability of
New Mexico users to implement water conservation measures. See pp. - - , ante. The Special Master also concluded that any injury to New Mexico would be "more than
offset" by the benefits to Colorado. Report of Special Master, p. 23. Both the availability of conservation measures
and a weighing of the harm and benefits that would result
from the diversion are factors relevant to the determination
of a just and equitable apportionment. However, the Special Master did not clearly state the factual findings supporting his reliance on these factors. Accordingly, we remand
for additional factual findings. In particular, we request
specific findings concerning the following areas: 13
18

An additional issue is the proper allocation of the burden of proof with
regard to these questions. Our cases establish that a state seeking to pre-

t.
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(1) the existing uses of water from the Vermejo River, and
the extent to which present levels of use reflect current or
historical water shortages or the failure of existing users to
develop their uses diligently;
(2) the available supply of water from the Vermejo River,
accounting for factors such as variations in streamflow, the
needs of current users for a continuous supply, the possibilities of equalizing and enhancing the water supply through
water storage and conservation, and the availability of substitute sources of water to relieve the demand for water from
the Vermejo River;
vent or enjoin a diversion by another state bears the burden of proving
that the diversion will cause it "real or substantial injury or damage."
Connecticut v. Massachusetts, supra, 282 U. S., at 672. See also New
Jersey v. New York, 283 U. S., at 344--345; Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S.,
at 117; Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U. S., at 393--394. This rule applies even
if the state seeking to prevent or enjoin a diversion is the nominal defendant in a lawsuit. In Colorado v. Kansas, for instance, Colorado sued Kansas seeking to enjoin further lawsuits by Kansas water users against Colorado users. Although Kansas was the defendant, we granted Colorado an
injunction based Kansas' failure to sustain the burden of showing that the
Colorado diversions had "worked a serious detriment to the substantial interests of Kansas." 320 U. S., at 400; see also id., at 389--390.
New Mexico must therefore bear the initial burden of showing that a diversion by Colorado will cause substantial injury to the interests of New
Mexico. In this case New Mexico has met its burden since any diversion
by Colorado, unless offset by New Mexico at its own expense, will necessarily reduce the amount of avaiilable to New Mexico users.
The burden has therefore shifted to Colorado to establish that a diversion should nevertheless be permitted under the principle of equitable
apportionment. Thus, with respect to whether reasonable conservation
measures by New Mexico will offset the loss of water due to Colorado's diversion, or whether the benefit to Colorado from the diversion will substantially outweigh the possible harm to New Mexico, Colorado will bear
the burden of proof. It must show, in effect, that without such a diversion
New Mexico would be using "more than its equitable share of the benefits
of a stream." Id., at 394. Moreover, Colorado must establish not only
that its claim is of a "serious magnitude," but also that its position is supported by "clear and convincing evidence." Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U. S., at 669. See also Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U. S., at 393;
Washington v. Oregon, 297 U. S., at 522.

'·
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(3) the extent to which reasonable conservation measures
in both states might eliminate waste and inefficiency in the
use of water from the Vermejo River;
(4) the precise nature of the proposed interim and ultimate
use in Colorado of water from the Vermejo River, and the
benefits that would result from a diversion to Colorado;
(5) the injury, if any, that New Mexico would likely suffer
as a result of any such diversion, taking into account the extent to which reasonable conservation measures could offset
the diversion. 14
IV
The flexible doctrine of equitable apportionment clearly extends to a state's claim to divert water for future uses.
Whether such a 'diversion should be permitted will turn on an
examination of all factors relevant to a just apportionment.
It is proper, therefore, to consider factors such as the extent
to which reasonable conservation measures by existing users
can offset the reduction in supply due to diversion, and
whether the be~efits to the state seeking the diversion substantially outweigh the harm to existing uses in another
state. We remand for specific factual findings relevant to
determining the just and equitable apportionment of the water of the Vermejo River between Colorado and New Mexico.
It is so ordered.

1
•

The Special Master may make any other factual findings that he considers relevant. Additional hearings may be held, although they may be
unnecessary in light of the extensive evidence already presented at trial.
Upon remand, the Special Master is free to reaffirm or modify his original
recommendation on the basis of the evidence and applicable principles of
equitable apportionment.
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80 Oriq. Colordao v. New Mexico

Dear Thurgood:
I will await further writing.
Sincerely,

Justice Marshall
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Colorado v. New Mexico & Corgin

Dear Thurgood:
I agree.

Sincerely,

Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference
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November 19, 1982
Re:

Colorado v. New Mexico, No. 80-0rig.

Dear Thurgood:
I agree. However, I would like to see just a bit
stronger language on the importance of protecting
existing economies. I suggest that the paragraph running
from page 10 to page 11 could be changed to the
following:
We recognize that the equities supporting
the protection of existing economies will usually
be compelling. The harm that may result from
disrupting established uses is typically certain
and immediate, whereas the potential benefits
from a proposed diversion may be speculative and
remote. Protection of existing economies,
however, does not require that users be permitted
to continue in unreasonably wasteful or
inefficient practices. In such a situation, the
countervailing equities supporting a future use
in one state may justify a oetriment to existing
users in another state. This approach comports
with our emphasis on flexibility in equitable
apportionment and also accords sufficient
protection to existing uses.
Sincerely,
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WJB ,Jr.
Justice Marshall
The Conference
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JUSTICE WILLIAM H . R E HNQUIST

November 22, 1982

Re:

No. 80 Orig.

Colorado v. New Mexico

Dear Thurgood:
You probably remember that the three "Westerners" at
Conference took positions in varying d e grees more favorable
to New Mexico in this case than some other Members of the
Conference. While I don't think that Byron, Sandra, and I
are in complete agreement as to how we would decide the
case, I did run the suggestions contained in this letter by
them in order to make sure that they would not disapprove of
your including them if you were inclined to do so.
I agree with almost all of your draft and will be happy
to join if you can· see your way clear to accommodating the
following relatively minor suggestions. · My principal
concern, which motivated this letter, is the implication in
the Master's Report that one of the three reasons why
Colorado was entitled to prevail was that the Vermejo
originated in Colorado. Your present draft does not approve
that suggestion, but I would like to see it expressly
disapproved because I think it is inconsistent with our
earlier cases. I would also like to persuade you to make
several other minor changes in the language.
If you are
agreeable, I will join your opinion.
1. Page 4, paragraph beginning "The Special Master's
••• ". Recite that there are three grounds, not two, and
that one is that "each [state] is entitled to a benefit from
the interstate river flowing within its borders." Report of
the Special Master, p. 8.
2. Page 6, paragraph beginning at the top of the page.
Revise the first two sentences to read something like the
following:
. I

-

2 -

"We conclude that two of the three criteria
relied upon by the Special Master comport with the
doctrine of equitable apportionment as it is
evolved in our prior cases. While we reject the
Special Master's view that Colorado was entitled
to some share of the waters of the Vermejo simply
because it rose in Colorado, we also reject New
Mexico's contention that the Special Master was
required to focus exclusively on the rule of
priority."
3. Page 8, first sentence in first full paragraph on
page:
Insert after the words "duty to" in the third line of
the paragraph the phrase "take reasonable steps to."
Delete or revise footnote 9, which I think presently
reflects an inaccurate view of western water law. I don't
think "beneficial use" is a synonym for "reasonably
efficient and diligent" use, at least in many western
states, and forfeiture upon non-use or abandonment is a much
more limited concept than inefficient use of water.
4. Page 13, final sentence in footnote 14:
I would
like to see this sentence either deleted or modified,
because it seems to me that in its present form it is
somewhat "loaded." If it is to be kept in, why not
something like this? "Upon remand, the Special Master is
free to reaffirm his original recommendation or to make a
different recommendation on the basis of the evidence and
applicable principles of equitable apportionment."
As I said earlier, I have shown a copy of this letter
to Byron and to Sandra, to make sure that my suggestions
would not trouble them.

Sincerely/

Justice Marshall
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CHAMBERS OF"

.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

November 24, 1982

No. 80 Orig.

Colorado v. New Mexico

Dear Thurgood,
If you are willing to include the change
suggested by Bill Brennan, and the changes suggested
by Bill Rehnquist, I could join your opinion, although
I would probably also write a separate concurring
opinion to explain why I join.
Sincerely,

~>r:.~ ~~_.,
Justice Marshall

Copies to the Conference
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Dear Thurgood : ~
of Sandra.

At Conference

expressed views similiar to those

I
',r."'

T. have note1 her letter to you of November 24, and
I also think I could join you if the suggested changes are
made.

Sincerely,

lfp/ss
cc:

~·:
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST
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November 29, 1982
Re:

No. 80 Orig.

Colorado· v. · New Mexico

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Since others have referred to my letter to Thurgood,
I am sending copies to all.
Sincerely,
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.JUSTICE WH. J . BRENNAN, JR.

November 30, 1982

Re:

Colorado v. New Mexico, No. 80-0rig.

Dear Thurgood:

I agree with the changes that Bill Rehnquist has
suggested.

Sincerely,

h~2

WJB,Jr.

Justice Marshall
The Conference
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December 4, 1982

Re:

No. 80-0rig.

Colorado v. New Mexico

. Dear Thurgood:
Please join me.
Sincerely, \

\}'Justice Marshall
cc:

The Conference
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6 December 1982

Re:

Colorado v. New Mexico, No. 80-0rig.

Dear Thurgood:
I am still with you.

.,

Since'rely,
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WJB,Jr.
Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference
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JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

December 6, 1982
I

J

Re:

80 Orig. - Colorado v. New Mexico

Dear Thurgood,
Please

join me

in

your

December 3.
Sincerely yours,

Justice

M~rshall

Copies to the Conference
cpm
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December 7' 1982

Re:
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Dear 'lliurgood:

Please join rre.

Respectiully'
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Justice Marshall
Cbpies to the Conference
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December 7, 1982

CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re: No. 80 Original - Colorado v. New Mexico
Dear Thurgood:
I shall go along.
recirculation of December 3.

Please

join me

in your

Sincerely,

Justice Marshall
cc: The Conference
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Decided December-, 1982

JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in the judgment.
The doctrine of prior appropriation includes the requirement that the appropriator's use of water be beneficial and
reasonable. What is reasonable, of course, does not admit of
ready definition, being dependent upon the particular facts
and circumstances of each case. In this case, the Special
Master has cast an accusatory finger at the Vermejo Conservancy District, concluding that "[t]he system of canals used
to transport the water to the fields is inefficient." Report of
the Special Master, p. 8.
Undoubtedly, there is evidence in the record indicating
that large losses of water occur through seepage and evaporation in transporting waters of the Vermejo through open
ditches for irrigation and stock watering. Tr. 1315. It is a
leap, however, from observing that large losses occur to concluding, as Colorado would have the Court do, that the practices of the Conservancy District are wasteful or unreasonable. As the Court observes, ante, at 8, 9, the extent of the
duty to conserve that may be placed upon the user is limited
to measures that are "financially and physically feasible,"
Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U. S. 419, 484 (1922), and "within
practicable limits." Ibid. 1 Nevertheless, in concluding that
'It is significant to note that in Wyoming v. Colorado , 259 U. S. 419
(1922), upon which the Court relies for the proposition that an affirmative
duty to conserve may be imposed on the States, ante, at 8, the Wyoming
appropriators already had storage facilities in place for equalizing the river's natural flow . In answering Wyoming's objection that she should not
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the Conservancy District's distribution system is "inefficient," the Special Master made no factual finding that improved economy in that system is within the practicable
means available to the District. 2
Colorado would have the Court assess the Conservancy
District's "waste" and "inefficiency" by a new yardsticki. e., not by comparing the economic gains to the District
with the costs of achieving greater efficiency, but by comparing the "inefficiency" of New Mexico's uses with the relative
benefits to Colorado of a new use. The Special Master has
succumbed to this suggestion. His recommendation that
Colorado be permitted a diversion embodies the judgment
that, because Colorado can, in some unidentified sense, make
"better" use of the waters of the Vermejo, New Mexico may
be forced to change her present uses.
Today the Court has also gone dangerously far toward accepting that suggestion. The .Court holds, ante, at 9, that it
is appropriate in equitable apportionment litigation to weigh
the harms and benefits to the competing States. It does so
notwithstanding its recognition, ante, at 10, that the potential benefits from a proposed diversion are likely to be speculative and remote, and therefore difficult to balance against
any threatened harms, and its concession, ibid., that the equities supporting protection of an existing economy will usually be compelling.
be burdened with conservation measures in order to permit a diversion by
Colorado, the Court observed:
"We think [the] doctrine [of appropriation] lays on each of these States a
duty to exercise her right reasonably and in a manner calculated to conserve the common supply. Notwithstanding her present contention, Wyoming has in fact proceeded on this line, for, as the proof shows, her appropriators, with her sanction, have provided and have in service reservoir
facilities which are adapted for the purpose and reasonably sufficient to
meet its requirements." Id., at 484-485 (emphasis added).
2
Evidence in the record indicates that the Conservancy District has employed an engineering firm to investigate the feasibility of constructing an
enclosed system to deliver stock water to the District's land owners. Tr.
1318.
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In equitable apportionment litigation between two prior
appropriation States concerning the waters of a fully appropriated river, this Court has never undertaken that balancing
task outside the concrete context of either two established
economies in the competing States dependent upon the waters to be apportioned 3 or of a proposed diversion in one
State to satisfy a demonstrable need for a potable supply of
drinking water. 4 In the former context, the Court may assess the relative benefit and detriment by reference to the actual fruits of use of the waters in the respective States. 5 In
3
See Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945); Washington v. Oregon, 297 U. S. 517 (1936); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46 (1907).
'See New Jersey v. New York, 283 U. S. 336 (1931); Connecticut v.
Massachusetts, 282 U. S. 660 (1931). It is also significant to note that
these disputes occurred between two riparian States.
Wyoming v. Colorado, supra, does not represent an exception to the
pattern stated in the text. The Court did not engage in any wholesale balancing of the relative harms and benefits to the two States from the proposed diversion. Rather, the Court imposed a very limited duty on Wyoming to make use of the storage facilities her appropriators already had in
place, see note 1 supra, for the purpose of calculating the dependable supply of water available to Wyoming. 259 U. S. , at 484. The Court was
thereby able to determine that the waters of the Laramie River were not
fully appropriated and that a share of the waters was available for Colorado's proposed use.
5
For example, in Kansas v. Colorado, supra, Kansas sought to restrain
Colorado from diverting waters of the Arkansas River for the irrigation of
lands in Colorado. Colorado had diverted waters from the river since the
1880's. As a result of irrigation, the population of the irrigated areas, the
number of acres cultivated, and the value of farm products produced in
these areas escalated dramatically. 206 U. S. , at 108-109. The Court
compared this demonstrated salutary effect of the irrigation on the economy of Colorado with the corresponding population changes and changes in
acreage and production of com and wheat in the affected Kansas counties
for the same period. !d., at 110-113. Using these concrete data, the
Court was able to discern some minimal injury to Kansas as a result of the
diminution of the flow of the Arkansas River. !d., at 113-114. Viewing
the overall impact of the available water on the two economies, however,
the Court concluded:
"[W]hen we compare the amount of this detriment [to Kansas] with the
great benefit which has obviously resulted to the counties in Colorado, it

'1
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the latter context, the compelling nature of the proposed use
reduces the speculation that might otherwise attend assessment of the benefits of a proposed diversion. Where, as
here, however, no existing economy in Colorado depends on
the waters of the Vermejo and the actual uses in New Mexico
rank in equal importance with the proposed uses in Colorado, 6 the difficulty of arriving at the proper balance is especially great.
This case therefore highlights the restraint with which the
Court should proceed .in apportioning interstate waters between a State seeking afuture use and a State with an existing economy dependent upon the waters to be apportioned.
The Court can only invite litigation within its original jurisdiction if it permits one State to obtain a diversion for a new
use upon that State's allegation that the second State is engaging in "wasteful" practices or that she can make "better"
use of the waters, even if the second State's uses are entirely
reasonable.
would seem that equality of right and equity between the two States forbids any interference with the present withdrawal of water in Colorado for
purposes of irrigation." Ibid.
Quite clearly, the Court was not forced to speculate about the benefit and
detriment of the diversion to the competing States.
Similarly, in Washington v. Oregon, supra, the Court was equipped to
assess the balance of harm and benefit to the economies from the diversion
at issue. Washington sought an injunction against Oregon's diversion of
waters of the Walla Walla River for irrigation in Oregon. On the one
hand, Oregon had an existing agricultural economy dependent upon irrigation from the Walla Walla. On the other hand , the evidence revealed that
there would be absolutely no benefit to Washington in prohibiting Oregon's
diversion during periods of water shortage; the nature of the river channel
was such that even if the water was not diverted by Oregon users, it would
be absorbed by the gravel beneath the channel and never reach Washington users. 297 U. S. , at 522-523. The Court therefore concluded that
"[t]o limit the long established use in Oregon would materially injure Oregon users without a compensating benefit to Washington users. " Id., at
523.
6
According to Colorado, the diverted water would be used "in industrial
operations at coal mines, agriculture, timbering, power generation, domestic needs and other industrial operations .... " Reply Brief for Colorado
8.
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I do not suggest, of course, that the Court must blind itself
to compelling evidence of waste by one State. Protection of
existing economies does not require that users be permitted
to continue in unreasonably wasteful or inefficient practices.
But the Court should be moved to exercise its original jurisdiction to alter the status quo between States only where
there is clear and convincing evidence, ante, at 11, n. 13, that
one State's use is unreasonably wasteful. To allow Colorado
a diversion upon a lesser showing comports neither with the
equality of rights of the litigants before us, see Connecticut
v. Massachusetts, 282 U. S. 660, 670 (1931), nor with the
sparing use that should be made of the Court's equitable powers, see id., at 669. Further, such action would seriously undermine the Court's affirmation, ante, at 7, that priority of
appropriation is the "guiding principle" in allocating waters
between two prior appropriation States.
The Court's remand reflects its judgment that the paucity
of the factual findings before us furnishes an inadequate basis
upon which to make "the delicate adjustment of interests" at
stake, Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U. S. 589, 618 (1945). I
concur in that disposition insofar as the Special Master's findings and conclusions do not provide a basis for determining
whether Colorado has demonstrated by clear and convincing
evidence that the Conservancy District has engaged in unreasonably wasteful practices.

j;n.vrtutt Qflllld gf

t4t 'Jnittb j;bdt$'

Jl'Mlfington, ~.<If. 21lc?'!~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

December 7, 1982

No. 80 Orig.

Colorado . v. New Mexico

Dear Lewis,
Thurgood did not incorporate the suggestions
made by Bill Brennan, which disappoints me greatly. I
could write a dissent with as much enthusiasm as a
concurrence in the judgment.
I enclose a draft of a concurrence in the
judgment but if you think it is preferable to dissent,
I have not circulated this to
please let me know.
anyone else as yet.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

.......
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To: Mr. Justice Powell
From: Jim
Re: Colorado v. New Mexico, No. 80 Original

Justice Marshall now has six votes for his draft and the Chief
will no doubt also join.

There is thus probably a need to expedite

any separate writing, and I thus suggest that you indicate to
Justice O'Connor that you will join her opinion.

I have worked with

Justice O'Connor's clerk on her present draft and have today
suggested that she clarify her views as to "unreasonably wasteful"
in a footnote.

Because that footnote may be more representative of

my idiosyncratic preferences than your views, you might not make
your approval unqualified.

I think, however, that the Justice

O'Connor's draft, as written or modified, is consistent with your
views as I understand them.
I agree that the draft is best styled a concurrence in the
judgment.
~

'l'o: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
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Justice O'Connor
Circulated: _ D
_E_C__8_ 19_82_ __
From:

Recirculated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
STATE OF COLORADO, PLAINTIFF v. STATE OF
NEW MEXICO AND ROBERT K. CORGIN, ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF NEW MEXICO
ON BILL OF COMPLAINT
No. 80, Orig.

Decided December-, 1982

JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in the judgment.
The doctrine of prior appropriation includes the requirement that the appropriator's use of water be beneficial and
reasonable. What is reasonable, of course, does not admit of
ready definition, being dependent upon the particular facts
and circumstances of each case. In this case, the Special
Master has cast an accusatory finger at the Vermejo Conservancy District, concluding that "[t]he system of canals used
to transport the water to the fields is inefficient." Report of
the Special Master, p. 8.
Undoubtedly, there is evidence in the record indicating
that large losses of water occur through seepage and evaporation in transporting waters of the Vermejo through open
ditches for irrigation and stock watering. Tr. 1315. It is a
leap, however, from observing that large losses occur to concluding, as Colorado would have the Court do, that the practices of the Conservancy District are wasteful or unreasonable. As the Court observes, ante, at 8, 9, the extent of the
duty to conserve that may be placed upon the user is limited
to measures that are "financially and physically feasible,"
Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U. S. 419, 484 (1922), and "within
practicable limits." Ibid. 1 Nevertheless, in concluding that
' It is significant to note that in Wyoming v. Colorado , 259 U. S. 419
(1922), upon which the Court relies for the proposition that an affirmative
duty to conserve may be imposed on the States, ante, at 8, the Wyoming
appropriators already had storage facilities in place for equalizing the river's natural flow. In answering Wyoming's objection that she should not
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the Conservancy District's distribution system is "inefficient," the Special Master made no factual finding that improved economy in that system is within the practicable
means available to the District. 2
Colorado would have the Court assess the Conservancy
District's "waste" and "inefficiency" by a new yardsticki. e., not by comparing the economic gains to the District
with the costs of achieving greater efficiency, but by comparing the "inefficiency" of New Mexico's uses with the relative
benefits to Colorado of a new use. The Special Master has
succumbed to this suggestion. His recommendation that
Colorado be permitted a diversion embodies the judgment
that, because Colorado can, in some unidentified sense, make
"better" use of the waters of the Vermejo, New Mexico may
be forced to change her present uses.
Today the Court has also gone dangerously far toward accepting that suggestion. The Court holds, ante, at 9, that it
is appropriate in equitable apportionment litigation to weigh
the harms and benefits to the competing States. It does so
notwithstanding its recognition, ante, at 10, that the potential benefits from a proposed diversion are likely to be speculative and remote, and therefore difficult to balance against
any threatened harms, and its concession, ibid., that the equities supporting protection of an existing economy will usually be compelling.
be burdened with conservation measures in order to permit a diversion by
Colorado, the Court observed:
"We think [the] doctrine [of appropriation] lays on each of these States a
duty to exercise her right reasonably and in a manner calculated to conserve the common supply. Notwithstanding her present contention, Wyoming has in fact proceeded on this line, for, as the proof shows, her appropriators, with her sanction, have provided and have in service reservoir
facilities which are adapted for the purpose and reasonably sufficient to
meet its requirements." /d., at 484-485 (emphasis added).
2
Evidence in the record indicates that the Conservancy District has employed an engineering firm to investigate the feasibility of constructing an
enclosed system to deliver stock water to the District's land owners. Tr.
1318.

.
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In equitable apportionment litigation between two prior
appropriation States concerning the waters of a fully appropriated river, this Court has never undertaken that balancing
task outside the concrete context of either two established
economies in the competing States dependent upon the waters to be apportioned 3 or of a proposed diversion in one
State to satisfy a demonstrable need for a potable supply of
drinking water. 4 In the former context, the Court may assess the relative benefit and detriment by reference to the actual fruits of use of the waters in the respective States. 6 In
3
See Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U. S. 589 (1945); Washington v. Oregon, 297 U. S. 517 (1936); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46 (1907).
• See New Jersey v. New York, 283 U. S. 336 (1931); Connecticut v.
Massachusetts, 282 U. S. 660 (1931). It is also significant to note that
these disputes occurred between two riparian States.
Wyoming v. Colorado, supra, does not represent an exception to the
pattern stated in the text. The Court did not engage in any wholesale balancing of the relative harms and benefits to the two States from the proposed diversion. Rather, the Court imposed a very limited duty on Wyoming to make use of the storage facilities her appropriators already had in
place, see note 1 supra, for the purpose of calculating the dependable supply of water available to Wyoming. 259 U. S., at 484. The Court was
thereby able to determine that the waters of the Laramie River were not
fully appropriated and that a share of the waters was available for Colorado's proposed use.
6
For example, in Kansas v. Colorado, supra, Kansas sought to restrain
Colorado from diverting waters of the Arkansas River for the irrigation of
lands in Colorado. Colorado had diverted waters from the river since the
1880's. As a result of irrigation, the population of the irrigated areas, the
number of acres cultivated, and the value of farm products produced in
these areas escalated dramatically. 206 U. S., at 108-109. The Court
compared this demonstrated salutary effect of the irrigation on the economy of Colorado with the corresponding population changes and changes in
acreage and production of corn and wheat in the affected Kansas counties
for the same period. Id. , at 110-113. Using these concrete data, the
Court was able to discern some minimal injury to Kansas as a result of the
diminution of the flow of the Arkansas River. I d., at 113--114. Viewing
the overall impact of the available water on the two economies, however,
the Court concluded:
"[W]hen we compare the amount of this detriment [to Kansas] with the
great benefit which has obviously resulted to the counties in Colorado, it
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the latter context, the compelling nature of the proposed use
reduces the speculation that might otherwise attend assessment of the benefits of a proposed diversion. Where, as
here, however, no existing economy in Colorado depends on
the waters of the Vermejo and the actual uses in New Mexico
rank in equal importance with the proposed uses in Colorado, 6 the difficulty of arriving at the proper balance is especially great.
This case therefore highlights the restraint with which the
Court should proceed in apportioning interstate waters between a State seeking afuture use and a State with an existing economy dependent upon the waters to be apportioned.
The Court can only invite litigation within its original jurisdiction if it permits one State to obtain a diversion for a new
use upon that State's allegation that the second State is engaging in "wasteful" practices or that she can make "better"
use of the waters, even if the second State's uses are entirely
reasonable.
would seem that equality of right and equity between the two States forbids any interference with the present withdrawal of water in Colorado for
purposes of irrigation." Ibid.
Quite clearly, the Court was not forced to speculate about the benefit and
detriment of the diversion to the competing States.
Similarly, in Washington v. Oregon, supra, the Court was equipped to
assess the balance of harm and benefit to the economies from the diversion
at issue. Washington sought an injunction against Oregon's diversion of
waters of the Walla Walla River for irrigation in Oregon. On the one
hand, Oregon had an existing agricultural economy dependent upon irrigation from the Walla Walla. On the other hand, the evidence revealed that
there would be absolutely no benefit to Washington in prohibiting Oregon's
diversion during periods of water shortage; the nature of the river channel
was such that even if the water was not diverted by Oregon users, it would
be absorbed by the gravel beneath the channel and never reach Washington users. 297 U. S., at 522-523. The Court therefore concluded that
"[t]o limit the long established use in Oregon would materially injure Oregon users without a compensating benefit to Washington users." !d., at
523.
' According to Colorado, the diverted water would be used "in industrial
operations at coal mines, agriculture, timbering, power generation, domestic needs and other industrial operations .... " Reply Brief for Colorado
8.
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I do not suggest, of course, that the Court must blind itself
to compelling evidence of waste by one State. Protection of
existing economies does not require that users be permitted
to continue in unreasonably wasteful or inefficient practices.
But the Court should be moved to exercise its original jurisdiction to alter the status quo between States only where
there is clear and convincing evidence, ante, at 11, n. 13, that
one State's use is unreasonably wasteful. To allow Colorado
a diversion upon a lesser showing comports neither with the
equality of rights of the litigants before us, see Connecticut
v. Massachusetts, 282 . U. S. 660, 670 (1931), nor with the
sparing use that should be made of the Court's equitable powers, see id., at 669. Further, such action would seriously undermine the Court's affirmation, ante, at 7, that priority of
appropriation is the "guiding principle" in allocating waters
between two prior appropriation States.
The Court's remand reflects its judgment that the paucity
of the factual findings before us furnishes an inadequate basis
upon which to make "the delicate adjustment of interests" at
stake, Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U. S. 589, 618 (1945). I
concur in that disposition insofar as the Special Master's findings and conclusions do not provide a basis for determining
whether Colorado has demonstrated by clear and convincing
evidence that the Conservancy District has engaged in unreasonably wasteful practices.
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December 8, 1982

80 Orig. Colorado v. New Mexico

Dear Sandra:
I like your opinion a great deal more than that of
Thurgood, and will be glad to join it.
I have a slight preference for calling it a
concurrence in the judgment, but - as you say - could join a
dissent with equal enthusiasm.
Sincerely,

Justice O'Connor
lfp/ss

December a, 1082
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Sandra :
judgment .

Please ioin me in your. opinion concurring in the
Sincerely ,

Justice O' Connor
lfp/ss
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